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Proceedings: Second International Conference on Recent Advances In Geotechnical Earthquake Engineering and Soli Dynamics,
March 11-15, 1991 Sl Louis, Missouri, Paper No. 5.80

Seismic Design Basis- The UK Regulatory Position for New
Nuclear Reactors
C. M. Patchett and R. J. Stubbs
HM Nuclear Installations Inspectorate, St. Peter's House, Balllol Road,
BOOTLE, Merseyslde, United Kingdom

ABSTRACT:
The purpose of this paper is to outline the seismic regulatory requirements relating to the site
licensing of new nuclear power installations in the UK, and to describe the background and justification of the
seismic design basis level for such installations. It outlines the potential seismic related hazards which should
be covered, the factors which are considered important in establishing the level of hazard under consideration, and
the techniques which could be used for hazard evaluation. In addition, the paper covers the level of uncertainty
associated with the methodology and analytical techniques used in evaluating the seismic hazards.
1.

INTRODUCTION

During the last decade HM Nuclear Installations
Inspectorate (NII) have been involved in the assessment of safety submissions for the Sizewell B PWR
which is currently under construction, and for the
proposed Hinkley Point C PWR. In both cases the
Inspectorate has submitted evidence to, and been cross
examined on, the assessment of the licensees safety
cases, at Public Inquiries (Refs 1 & 2).
This paper outlines the g~neral approach taken by the
Inspectorate in the assessment of external hazards for
those two sites, and then describes in detail the
extent of information required from the licensees to
satisfy the Inspectorate on the major factors which
determine the seismic hazard. It is not intended that
this paper be used as a check list, it reflects the
Inspectorate's experience in this topic for the two
most recently proposed nuclear power plants. It also
discusses the Inspectorate's approach to the uncertainties which are inevitably present in seismic hazard
determination.
Although not a consideration of this paper, the latest
Advanced Gas Cooled Reactors (AGR) built in the UK are
also designed against the seismic hazard, as are the
more recent nuclear chemical plant. However these
installations being designed whilst UK seismic
standards were being developed have slightly different
design basis criteria. There is nevertheless an
equivalence to the UK PWR's. The older Magnox reactors
and nuclear chemical plant whilst not designed with
the seismic hazard in mind, clearly have an inherent
seismic capability. This is being assessed, and
strengthened where appropriate, under the Long Term
Safety Review, and Fully Developed Safety Case for
reactors and chemical plant respectively.
2.

LEGISLATIVE BASIS

In the United Kingdom no site may be used for the
purpose of installing or operating any commercial
nuclear installation unless a nuclear site licence has
been granted to a corporate body by the Health and
Safety Executive (HSE). The Inspectorate is that part
of the HSE which is responsible for administering this
licensing function. Specific Acts of Parliament and
supporting legislation provide general requirements for

the safety of nuclear installations, but specific
requirements are covered by licence conditions which are
binding by law.
Under these Acts, absolute responsibility for nuclear
safety rests with the licensee. The duty of the
Inspectorate is to ensure that appropriate standards are
developed, achieved and maintained by the licensee, to
ensure necessary safety precautions are taken and to
regulate and monitor the plant by means of its powers
under the stte licence. The Inspectorate independ,~tly
reviews and assesses the licensees to ensure compliance
with the requirements at all stages throughout the plant
life. The Inspectorate does not operate a prescriptive
regime, which means that licensees are free to develop
their own safety standards and plant safety cases using
appropriate methodologies.
3.

Nil SAFETY ASSESSMENT PRINCIPLES

In order that a consistent approach is adopted towards
safety assessment the Inspectorate has developed Safety
Assessment Principles, for nuclear power reactors (Ref
3) and nuclear chemical plant (Ref 4), which are primarily for the use of its own staff, but also with a view
to assisting designers and operators. These assessment
principles form a statement of the safety assessment
related to new plant. They contain fundamental requirements and basic principles supported by a set of engineering principles. The two referenced documents are
currently under revision.
The safety submission from a licensee for a new installation should show that the design meets their safety
standards, the Inspectorate assesses the submission to
ensure compliance with it's Safety Assessment Principles.
Naturally licensees are encouraged to demonstrate that
their standards comply with the Inspectorate's Principles.
For plant faults, ie; faults which would occur in safety
related plant or equipment the Inspectorate has adopted
the following numerical criteria.
(1) For any single accident which could give rise to a
large uncontrolled release of radioactivity, (more than
a few ERL, which for the whole body is currently a dose
equivalent of 500mSv) to the environment resulting
from some or all of the protection systems and barriers
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being breached or failed, then the over a 11 design
should ensure that the accident frequency is less than
1E-7 per year.
(2) The total frequency of all accidents leading to
uncontrolled releases should be less than 1E-6 per
year.
Adoption of these criteria mean that a plant which
meets them falls within maximum tolerable risk levels
for individual members of the public and society as
proposed in the HSE published discussion document on
the Tolerability of Risk (Ref 5).
In case of the seismic hazard, the determination of an
event for plant design having a nominal return period
of about once in 1QOOO years is not considered unreasonable for the UK. This event is more commonly
known as the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) for nuclear
power plant. For nuclear chemical plant it is generally referred to as the Design Basis Earthquake (DBE).
Consequent upon such a design basis event and the
criteria given in section 3(1) above, it is necessary
that the protection system or barrier required to protect against the event has a reliability of the order
of 1E-3 per year. Independently of this the
Inspectorareconsiders that a well engineered safety
system has a probability of failure between 1E-5 and
1E-3 per demand (Ref 3). It is therefore concluded
that a plant appropriately designed and qualified
against the SSE/DBE meets the Inspectorate's criteria
for a single accident that could give rise to a large
uncontrolled release of radioactivity.

5.

Determination of the seismic hazard can be established
in several ways, for instance; a deterministic route
establishing the maximum potential earthquake, a
probabilistic route with deterministic input parameters, or a full probabilistic route. In the UK
licensees have generally favoured the probabilistic
route with deterministic input parameters.
Determination of this hazard requires input from
various sources. These can generally be defined as the
geology of the potential site and surrounding region,
and seismological information such as historical
earthquake and instrumental data. Using this information it should be possible to build a model of the
regional earthquake environment around the site.
Figure 1 describes the process leading to the determination of the seismic hazard. Each of the topics is
discussed separately below.
5.1

GEOLOGICAL INFORMATION

In determining the geology the objective is to understand the tectonics and consequently the seismotectonics of the region. One aspect is to attempt to
obtain geological evidence to allow assumptions to be
made about the size of the region where the seismotectonics can be considered to be similar. The other
aspect is to determine whether any significantly active
faulting occurs on or close to the site, which may have
to be modelled as an independent source of seismic
events in the hazard analysis.
The extent of the regional study will depend upon both
the seismology and geology to ensure that all relevant
data is obtained. Such data may be available from
published sources and will require the assistance of
specialists who have worked in the area of concern.

The Inspectorate's Safety Assessment Principles are
concerned generally with targets which should be met
when establishing the seismic hazHrd at a site. More
detailed guidance on establishing the seismic hazard
for a potential nuclear site is given by the IAEA in
their code of practice, (Ref 6), and Safety Guide, (Ref
7). The Inspectorate considers these documents to
outline the minimum standards which have to beachieved.
4.

DETERMINATION OF SEISMIC HAZARD

Close to the site the objective should be to establish
the potential for permanent ground displacement. It is
expected that detailed geological mapping would be
carried out in the area to understand the site geology.
In addition geophysical and geotechnical studies
should be carried out supported by laboratory testing
where appropriate. This could include the drilling of
boreholes and trial pits.

SEISMIC HAZARDS

The Inspectorate expects a licensee to identify in the
safety case for a potential site all those hazards
associated with earthquake activity which could affect
plant safety. For example; earthquake ground motion,
ground rupture, liquefaction, ground subsidence,
landslips, earthquake generated tsunamis and seiches
generated by long period ground motions. In the case
of Sizewell B, the first and third examples were of
particular concern.

In all these studies the Inspectorate considers that
information from deep reflection surveys can be of
valuable assistance in establishing the extent of
faulting at depth. In addition the crustal stress of
a region will assist in the understanding of the
current tectonics. Satellite imagery can also provide
valuable information on surface features which are not
readily visible from the ground.

Initially the licensee should review all these potential hazards to determine whether any one is large
enough to prevent use of the site.

5.2

HISTORICAL AND INSTRUMENTAL SEISMICITY

It is clearly very important to understand the historical seismicity of the region and to identify any
possible trends. It is considered that all relevant
historical seismicity should be determined back to the
earliest possible time. The UK is extremely fortunate
in having primary records from ecclesiastical and
other sources dating back to before 1000 AD. The
information should be used to determine parameters
such as intensity, epicenter, focal depth, or any
spatial or temporal trends. The techniques used in
establishing such information should be well founded,
(Ref 8).

Having demonstrated the site is viable each of the
hazards should be assessed by the licensee and compared
against the safety criteria. Depending on the location
some of the hazards can be readily discounted, but
others may require more rigorous assessment to ascertain the design basis level. The hazards which
have been the subject of detailed safety cases by
licensees in the UK in recent years are seismic ground
motion·, 1iquefaction and ground rupture. The
·Inspectorate's approach to the assessment of ground
motion and ground rupture is covered in the following
sections.

More recently instrumental data has become available,
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and it is necessary that all relevant measurements for
the region should be collated and estimates of, for
instance; magnitude, focal depth, and epicenter be
determined. Such information should be reviewed to
ensure that it is due to earthquake ground motion
rather than man induced events, such as mining activities or quarry blasting. From the interpretation of
instrumental and macroseismic data it is possible to
assign magnitudes to historical events.

confidence levels. Such calculations are subject to
uncertainty in the input parameters which should be
addressed by means of sensitivity studies. It is the
Inspectorate's opinion that for UK seismicity the most
important factors are the input parameters associated
with the geological interpretation ofthe region. Experience in the assessment of licensee's safety cases
has shown that this area is the most sensitive in
determining the seismic hazard level.

6.0 METHODS FOR ESTIMATION OF THE SEISMIC DESIGN
BASIS GROUND MOTION

7.0 GROUND RUPTURE

In order to determine the ground motion hazard, the
information derived from the geological and historical
databases established from information in sections 5
should be merged to establish a seismotectonic model
of the region. In general in the UK, it is considered
that such a model will comprise areas of diffuse
seismicity which originate from earthquakes not attributable to specific structures, and areas attributed to
known seismic sources. It is necessary that all that
is reasonably practicable should be done to establish
a model that takes into account the most recent geological understanding of the region under consideration.

Ground rupture as a potential hazard was noted in
section 4. However it is for the licensee to decide
how his safety case will address the hazard. There are
a number of possible approaches the licensee could use
to demonstrate compliance with the Inspectorate's
Assessment Principles. For example; to show that there
are no faults under the potential site which would
cause ground rupture leading to the failure of structures, and to a large release of radioactivjty.
Alternatively they could demonstrate that there is a
less than one in 10 million chance per year of a significant fault rupture occuring. Currently licensees
have attempted to meet the latter option.

The design basis ground motions can be characterized
by time histories and response spectra for a suite of
damping values. If sufficient data is available then
it would be appropriate to calculate specific site
response spectra. Otherwise a more generic approach
is taken as is described later.

The relationship of faulting at or near the site with
regional faulting should be determined, to ascertain
whether there is any correlation with faults known to
be significant in terms of regional activity. This
area is subjective and requires the expertise and skill
of geologists with previous experience of the region.

6.1.1

Having identified any fault which could be considered
as potentially active, ie; those relating to major
fault structures, the time of last activity should be
determined. This could be achieved from an understanding of the regional tectonics if the potential
activity is small. If there is strong evidence from
seismicity data suggesting very recent movement {by
geological timescales), or the structure is close to
the site, further more detailed investigations may be
necessary. The Hinkley Point C site was an example of
this, where detailed investigation of a neighbouring
fault was necessary, (Ref 12).

DETERMINISTIC TECHNIQUES

As stated above the deterministic route would in all
probability involve establishing the maximum earthquake
potential for the site. This would be expected to be
based upon the information established from the studies
covered in section 5. The maximum earthquake potential
associated with the structures identified from the
seismotectonic model would be established using conservative assumptions. It is considered that such a
route may well be appropriate in regions where there
are well defined structures showing regular seismicity.
However in areas of low seismicity the maximum potential earthquake may be difficult to determine due to
the lack of seismic activity and could lead to the
assignment of a very conservative value, with little
scientific support.
6.1.2

PROBABILISTIC TECHNIQUES

Probabilistic techniques which use data derived by
deterministic means are considered by the Inspectorate
to be a suitable method for establishing the earthquake
hazard in areas of low seismicity. Such methods should
use the details and parameters which have been established from the seismotectonic model. This would
include modelling potential sources of activity and
areas of diffuse seismicity which will have been
derived from the instrumental, historical and geological databases.
It is currently considered that a full integrated
probabilistic analysis is not realistic. However an
analysis such as that developed by McGuire (Ref 10),
based on a probabilistic model but with deterministic
input data is a more appropriate method, and has been
used by a licensee, (Ref 11). This does not mean that
other methods would not be acceptable. It is the responsibility of the licensees to determine suitable
methodologies which the Inspectorate will assess.
The results of such models would give a best estimate
peak free field acceleration hazard curve for varying

Currently this is an area where there exists a variety
of techniques which can be used to date fault movement in areas of low seismicity such as the UK. These
are often used in other areas and their validity and
degrees of error are knowg,and therefore their use is
generally accepted. One of the main difficulties is
identifying the material which should be taken from the
fault to determine the date of last movement. Consequently the dating process often gives rise to large
uncertainty. This is not to denigrate the techniques,
rather it is necessary that the licensee does all that
is reasonably practicable to establish a realistic
result.
8.

GENERATION OF RESPONSE SPECTRA AND TIME HISTORIES

In the UK a generic set of response spectra have been
developed by the licensees which are considered to be
representative of UK seismicity. Current practise in
the UK due to a sparsity of real earthquake time history
measurements is based upon choosing a number of earthquake time histories from other regions. These are
European and US events that are considered to represent UK earthquakes. From these records, standard
response spectra are generated using the USNRC approach
(Ref 9). For a given installation the spectra would
be normalized to the peak ground acceleration for the
site. Furthermore the spectra are classified as hard,
intermediate and sort ground conditions which are related to depth to a competent rockhead level. Time
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histories can then be derived from the appropriate
spectra.
This overall approach has been assessed by the
Inspectorate and found to be realistically conservative.
9.

UNCERTAINTIES IN THE HAZARD DETERMINATION

As is apparent from above the determination of the
seismic hazard is subject to uncertainty, because of
this the Inspectorate requires that sensitivity
analyses be carried out on the calculations to establish
whether any one parameter, if changed, would significantly affect the results. In addition it is also
expected that this would include investigations into
the constraints of the chosen model, such that if a
different model were chosen the significance of the
change on the results of the hazard analysis could be
determined.
Furthermore, since the hazard is calculated for SSE
which generally has a mean return period of 10,000
years the Inspectorate has asked licensees to demonstrate the capability of their structures at a
hazard level beyond this value. This is to demonstrate
that there is no sudden disproportionate increase in
the risk for an increase in hazard level beyond the
SSE.
Currently the hazard level at which plants are assessed for their performance beyond the SSE is forty per
cent greater than the SSE. The licensees do not design their structures to meet this level, but assess
the capability of the plant to ensure that no condition exists such that there is a disproportionate
increase in the risk from the plant due to radioactive
releases. Clearly safety margins will be less than at
the design basis, and this is accepted.
10.

REPORTING AND RECORDING OF INFORMATION SUPPORTING
THE SAFETY CASE FOR A PLANT

In the preparation of a safety case for the seismic
hazard it is important that the information used is
properly reported and recorded. Such a process should
be subject to quality assurance procedures which are
auditable.

REFERENCES
1. Sizewell B Public Inquiry: HM Nuclear
Installations Inspectorate, Proof of Evidence, NII/P/2,
1983.
2. Hinkley Point C Public Inquiry: HM Nuclear
Installations Inspectorate, Proof of Evidence,
HSE(NII)3, 1988.
3. Safety Assessment Principles for Nuclear Power
Reactors, Health and Safety Executive, 1979; ~blished
by HMSO.
4. Safety Assessment Principles for Nuclear Chemical
Plant, Health and Safety Executive, 1983; published
by HMSO.
5. The Tolerability of Risk from Nuclear Power
Stations, Health and Safety Executive, 1988; published
by HMSO.
6. Code on Safety of Nuclear Power Plant: Siting.
IAEA Safety Series 50-C-S (Revl), 1988.
7. Earthquake and Associated Topics in relation to
Nuclear Power Plant Siting. IAEA Safety Series 50-SG-S1.
8. Methodology and Procedures for Compilation of
Historical Earthquake Data, IAEA-TECDOC-434, 1987.
9. Design response Spectra for seismic Design of
Nuclear Power Plants. USNRC Regulatory Guide 1.60.
10. Effects of Uncertainty in Seismicity on estimates
of earthquake Hazard for the East Coast of the United
States, Bulletin Seismological society of America, Vol
67, no 3, 1977.
11. A Review of Seismic Hazard Assessment Methods;
CEGB Seismic Hazard Working Party Report Vol 3M.
12. Hinkley Point Hazard Assessment; CEGB Seismic
Hazard Working Party Report Vol 2A(Supplement).

One of the more important contentious aspects of a
safety case is where judgements by experts have been
made, either through a committee or individually. The
Inspectorate considers that in particular in such cases
they should be recorded so the assessor is able to
establish how and why decisions were made.
11.

CONCLUSIONS

It is considered that the determination of the seismic
hazard is still in an evolutionary stage and subject
to many uncertainties. Nevertheless the work carried
out in support of siting nuclear plant in the UK is
considered to use realistic models based upon the best
available geological and seismological data. Consequently, it ensures that the design basis levels
determined are scientifically and technically justifiable and not overly conservative.
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